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Abstract: This article investigates the institutionalization and the practices of
charity that sustained imperial rule in the early modern Spanish Empire. The
article proposes that the polycentric Spanish Empire of the 16th to 18th centuries
faced a fundamental challenge in terms of justifying the extension of power
beyond its original territory of legitimization through custom and (invented)
history. This challenge was dealt with through recourse to an ideology of good
governance in corporate society. It institutionalized differences across race/
caste, urban/rural, professional, gender and other categories in collectives that
held part of a layered and fragmented sovereignty. But unlike its modern
successor empires and nation states, it did not have to rely systematically on
the essentialization of difference. Thus, good governance could legitimize the
extension of hegemony beyond the original territory of political legitimization
and charity played a central role in this. A material caritative complex sui
generis linked the moral economy of charity, which legitimized local elites,
with their own financing needs and those of the imperial polity via the financial
acumen of religious and charitable institutions.
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The arrival of global history as a mainstream field has posed a particular
challenge to the study of empire. Some have criticized global history for being
little more than imperial history in a new disguise, and undoubtedly some
traditional imperial historians have tried to jump on the bandwagon of global
history.1 Nevertheless, the new global history approaches have served to shar-
pen historians’ sensibility to the pitfalls of century-old methodological centrisms
(be they Euro-, Sino-, Christian-, Islamic-). And they promise to emancipate the
field from its problematic roots as “national” imperial histories of the British,
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French, Portuguese, or any other empire.2 Global approaches such as reciprocal
comparisons have helped us understand the practices and institutions that
underpinned imperial hegemony in more sophisticated ways.3 The complex
interactions of conquerors and conquered that resulted in assemblages of cul-
tures and structures of social, political, and economic governance which origi-
nated as much in annexed territories as in imperial capitals have come into
sharper relief.4 Questions of power, legitimacy of rule, and sovereignty in
imperial formations turned out to be much more complicated than national
historiographies of the post-colonial period would have allowed for.5
The idea of empires of charity sounds like an oxymoron. Imperial practices
are more often linked to conquest, conversion, extraction, and self-interest while
charity is usually analyzed within a frame of concern for the weak, religious
observance, and altruism. Drawing on early modern Spain’s American Empire as
a case study, the first section of the article addresses the larger question of how
to define an empire in the light of recent historiography, and the role of charity
as an imperial practice. The second section looks at the governance structures
and material well-being in Spanish America as a way to contextualize material
conditions for and the purpose of charity. Finally, section three shows that
charity’s contribution to the legitimacy of imperial domination in Spanish
America went far beyond concerns for the poor and social peace or the redemp-
tion of givers’ sins. In Spanish America charity became part of the financial
architecture of the empire that linked subjects of the Monarchy in a complex set
of dependencies across social strata. The collapse of this architecture threatened
the well-being of very large sections of society thus helping to sustain imperial
rule. The significance of charity was therefore not restricted to the realm of
welfare and religious practice. Instead it was a fundamental part of the reper-
toire of imperial practices.
2 Richard Drayton and David Motadel, “Discussion: The Futures of Global History,” Journal of
Global History 13, 1 (2018).
3 Joseph E. Inikori, Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International
Trade and Economic Development (New York: Cambridge University, 2002), Gareth Austin,
“Reciprocal Comparison and African History: Tackling Conceptual Eurocentrism in the Study
of Africa’s Economic Past” African studies review 50, 3 (2007).
4 Serge Gruzinski, The Mestizo Mind: The Intellectual Dynamics of Colonization and
Globalization (New York; London: Routledge, 2002).
5 See e. g. Lauren A. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires,
1400–1900 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Saliha Belmessous,
Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500–1920 (Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
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I
The point of departure for this discussion must necessarily be what we mean
when we say empire. The many attempts at defining empire in recent publica-
tions illustrate vividly that there is nothing obvious about this question.6 Most
start from a seemingly simple categorization, which however is then followed by
a long list of qualifying characteristics such as distinctions between empires of
settlement and exploitation or contiguous and overseas ones. A good starting
point could be the helpful definition suggested by Burbank and Cooper in 2010,
that “Empires are large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power
extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they
incorporate new people.” They add that empires rely on “the externalization of
sources of wealth.”7 The elements contained are those that feature in most
definitions: large size and an expansionary drive at least in part as a means of
acquiring extractable wealth from incorporated territories. But these polities also
tended to be “empires of difference” because they lacked the strong homogeniz-
ing ambition of the nation state of the 19th and 20th centuries and were overall
more tolerating of religious, cultural, linguistic, and institutional diversity.8
As parsimonious as this definition is, I will argue in the rest of the article
that it still includes one descriptor that is historically not a necessary condition
for empire, namely that empires strove to extract wealth from conquered terri-
tories. I posit that empires are not necessarily associated with the extraction of
wealth; indeed extraction potentially endangered imperial survival as we
will see.9 My working definition of imperial formations will thus be even more
frugal: Empires are polities that extend power beyond the territory of original
political legitimization. This definition concentrates attention on what I consider
the fundamental issue of political legitimacy. What all empires have in common
6 See e. g. Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, 2nd ed. (Princeton:
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005); Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory,
Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Tom Toelle, “Early Modern
Empires: An Introduction to the Recent Literature,” in H-Soz-Kult, 20.04.2018, <www.hsozkult.
de/literaturereview/id/forschungsberichte-2021 > (2018).
7 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of
Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).
8 Ibid.; Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
9 Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, “Negotiating Power: Fiscal Constraints and Financial
Development in Early Modern Spain and the Spanish Empire,” in Questioning Credible
Commitment, ed. D’Maris Coffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Winton Centre
for Financial History, 2013).
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is a problem of legitimization: because they extended their spatial reach they
could not rely on tradition and custom to legitimize rule via established prac-
tices and institutions. The expansionary nature of empires reduced the scope for
a legitimizing narrative of the kind that simply rewrote history to make rule
appear as existing from time immemorial because territory and political com-
munity were ostensibly non congruent. That deprived empires of the most
powerful ideological basis of political rule: (invented) history.
My emphasis on the expansion of territory beyond the spatial boundaries of
original political legitimation should not be mistaken to imply that empires
relied particularly strongly on notions of territoriality. It has rightly been argued
that early modern empires more often than other polities had only hazy ideas of
exact boundaries and few ambitions and less means to define them.10 As Herzog
has shown the boundaries of European empires outside Europe were drawn not
in the metropolis but in situ in negotiations that involved Euro-descendants and
native populations, albeit often in skewed power relations.11 Nevertheless, early
modern empires clearly laid claim, which they could not justify in terms of
customary practices, to new territories. That set them apart from other contem-
porary polities such as city states, urban alliances, princely or republican
territorial states, or chiefdoms for that matter. Empires were so often character-
ized by fluid claims to spaces on their margins precisely because they could not
rely on custom and history for their claims. Thus the issue always revolved
around the legitimacy of rule and only secondarily around concrete borders.
Empires were therefore characterized by a set of practices of power, a
repertoire of strategies needed to justify the extension of power both ex-ante
and ex-post. To put it another way, empires needed an ideology of power that
rationalized why conquest was a justified means of changing the structures of
political power in a conquered territory and, once conquest has occurred, to
legitimize the continued control over this territory.12 Early modern authors took
it for granted that conquest was the easy bit, maintaining hegemony was the
tricky part.13 With very limited repressive capacity at their disposal early modern
empires could not rely on violence alone but had to create a narrative of “good
governance.” Subject peoples in turn used demands for what one of the first
10 Toelle, “Early Modern Empires: An Introduction to the Recent Literature.”
11 Tamar Herzog, Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2015).
12 Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border
Thinking (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
13 Anthony Pagden, Lords of the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France,
C.1500–1800 (New Haven: 1995), ch. 4.
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indigenous chroniclers of the Andes region called “buen gobierno” as a power-
ful tool of negotiation.14 Describing Inca or Mexica (Aztec) rule as tyrannical,
and therefore the conquest of Peru or Mexico as the liberation of subject people,
could serve to some extent to justify conquest.15 But the struggles of Spanish
jurists to find excuses for the conquest of the Americas even within their own
legal world (never mind that of the conquered peoples) were real. Even the
famous requerimiento, which Spanish conquerors read to unsuspecting indigen-
ous populations to give them a choice of subjugation or war, offered “to receive
you [the indigenous] with love and charity” as part of its rationalization for
conquest.16 Far away from the American shores the tortured arguments of
Spanish scholastics that Indians had denied Spaniards their ius perigrinandi,
the right to travel (and mission), were understood to be a weak rationalization
for conquest to begin with. Worse still, they certainly did not suffice to legit-
imate continued rule over American subject populations even in the minds of
most contemporary Spanish lawyers and churchmen.17
One way to ease the burden of legitimization of imperial rule was political
practices that allowed for the location of power to be decentralized. Imperial
history was in the past almost invariably conceptualized as a center-periphery
dynamic. Historiographies in former imperial “centers” went from analyzing
glorious colonial pasts to trying to understand the post-colonial heritage of
modern European nation states in the Netherlands, Spain, or elsewhere. At the
same time, for nationalist post-independence historiographies in former colonies
the “alienness” of remote rule from a far-away metropolis was a fundamental
piece of emancipatory language. However, recent research shows that imperial
formations were sometimes very decentralized, relying heavily on intermediate
power centers and elites. In the case of the Iberian empires, many now conceive
of these polities as polycentric, that is a complex web of decision-making centers
14 Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala and Rolena Adorno, Poma de Ayala: El Primer Nueva
Corónica Y Buen Gobierno (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University of
Copenhagen, 2002), Rolena Adorno Guaman Poma: Writing and Resistance in Colonial Peru
(Austin, Tex.: Univ. of Texas Press, 2000).
15 Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, Brian S. Bauer, and Vania Smith-Oka, The History of the Incas
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007 [1572]). For Mexico see Cortes’ description of Mexica
tyranny, Hernán Cortés, Anthony Pagden, and John Huxtable Elliott, Hernan Cortes: Letters
from Mexico (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2001).
16 Juan López de Palacios Rubios, “Notificación Y Requerimiento Que Se Ha Dado De Hacer a
Los Moradores De Las Islas En Tierra Firme Del Mar Océano Que Aún No Están Sujetos a
Nuestro Señor” (1513).
17 Annabel S. Brett, Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law
(Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2011), pp.26ff; Tamar Herzog,A Short History of European
Law: The Last Two and a Half Millennia (Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press 2018).
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with relatively flat hierarchies between them.18 Comparative histories of empire
have shown that they could take different shapes along a continuum from
centralizing, to power devolving, and polycentric with the exact shape of each
historical example hotly debated. As I have shown elsewhere polycentric struc-
tures went a long way to turn imperial subjects into stakeholders of empire who
had an interest in its survival. By incorporating notions of urban or territorial
quasi sovereign rights into the wider web of empire newly conquered or founded
cities could be co-opted into a network structure of sovereignty. One particularly
famous example of this process was the alliance between Tlaxcala and the
Spanish, which reverberated in negotiations for special status of the former
from the 16th to the 19th centuries.19
The relationship between power, sovereignty, and legitimacy of rule in early
modern empires becomes clearer if we compare them with their 19th and 20th
century successors. Imperial political power depended on notions of sovereignty
to establish legitimacy until well into the 19th century. Only by the 20th century
technologies of coercion had been perfected sufficiently to make it viable for
some empires to rely almost exclusively on repression – German rule in Namibia
comes to mind. The increased technical and administrative capacities of imper-
ial states in the 19th and 20th centuries were certainly important. But I would
argue that the more fundamental rupture had to do with changing conceptions
of sovereignty. From the 19th century onwards sovereignty began to be under-
stood as indivisible. This was a genuinely new conception, which truth be told
only translated into coherent legal, administrative, and political practices over a
long period of time. Legal pluralism, the co-existence of more or less competitive
legal normative orders persisted in reality and in many former colonial countries
it persists to this day. But once sovereignty was understood as indivisible legal
pluralism began to be normatively problematic. Early modern understandings of
sovereignty, by contrast, had been fragmented, overlapping, and layered
18 Pedro Cardim et al., Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal
Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony? (Eastbourne; Portland, Or.: Sussex Academic Press,
2012); Regina Grafe, “Tyrannie À Distance: La Construction De L’état Polycentrique Et Les
Systèmes Fiscaux En Espagne (1650–1800),” in Ressources Publiques Et Construction Étatique
En Europe, ed. Katia Beguin (Paris: (IGPDE), Ministère des Finances et des Comptes Publics,
Ministère de l’Economie, de l’Industrie et du Numérique, 2015).
19 See for example documents detailing negotiations between the Tlaxcala Indians and the
Spanish monarchy from the 16th to the 19th century, Newberry Library, VAULT Ayer MS 1162. See
also Ana Díaz Serrano, “La Doble Orilla. El Modelo Político De La Monarquía Hispánica Desde
Una Perspectiva Comparada. Los Cabildos De Murcia Y Tlaxcala Durante El Siglo Xvi,” in Las
Monarquías Española Y Francesa, Siglos Xvi–Xviii: ¿Dos Modelos Políticos?, ed. Anne Dubet and
José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2010).
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between corporate groups and “historic” territories. Legal pluralism was there-
fore the norm and unproblematic.20
These fundamentally different conceptions of sovereignty mattered because
they delimited the strategies to legitimize rule. Early modern forms of political
representation were mediated via the corporate status of towns, guilds, the
Church, the Estates, free and unfree status, chartered companies, or ethnic
groups such as castas in colonial Spanish America.21 The nature of such a
system of shared and overlapping rights and duties of bodies, each of which
was endowed with a share of sovereignty, “institutionalized” difference. But
precisely because difference was institutionalized and rights and duties defined
as pertaining to collectives rather than individuals there was no overriding need
to essentialize them. Thus the boundaries between these categories could
remain fluid, while individuals could belong to multiple and sometimes contra-
dictory categories. How else would we understand that an Afro-descendent slave
could be a master of a craft guild in colonial Lima?22 A person could be at
the same time unfree, but enjoy the legal and political privileges of a senior
member of a guild. The archives are full of the myriad of conflicts that this
provoked. But practical problems aside, normatively there was no fundamental
incompatibility.
Fragmented and layered sovereignty, which was located in a multitude of
corporate bodies, enabled early modern European empires theoretically to
incorporate diverse new subject populations in a way that was fundamentally
identical to that applied in the original territory of political legitimization.
Treating people differently according to their corporate, religious, ethnic, or
territorial status paradoxically meant applying the same rules that had been at
work in the original imperial territory. This facilitated the justification of expan-
sion ex-post through an ideology of “good governance.” It should be noted that
this does not mean that early modern imperial societies did not engage in
essentializing the differences between corporate groups in society. But the
20 Lauren A. Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900,
Studies in Comparative World History (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
21 Note that the language of corporate rights sometimes makes it hard to see the similarities
between Anglophone contexts and continental European ones. Compare Philip J. Stern,
“‘Bundles of Hyphens.’ Corporations as Legal Communities in the Early Modern British
Empire,” in Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850 (NYU Press, 2013). and Pedro Cardim,
“The Representatives of Asian and American Cities at the Cortes of Portugal,” in Polycentric
Monarchies. How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global
Hegemony?, ed. Pedro Cardim, et al. (Sussex Academic, 2012).
22 Francisco Quiroz, Artesanos Y Manufactureros En Lima Colonial (Lima: Instituto de Estudios
Peruanos, 2008).
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increasing racialization of particular groups was not necessary as a device to
sustain an “empire of difference.”23
By contrast, modern political legitimacy could only be constructed via a
form of unitary and homogenous representation of a body politic (which came to
be defined as the nation). Difference might or might not be institutionalized in
this context. Indeed, by the second third of the 20th century most European
empires struggled with attempts to maintain difference while dealing with the
demand that all those governed should be equal citizens.24 But no matter if
difference was turned into legal and institutional structures or not, it necessarily
had to be essentialized to rationalize the unequal treatment that was incompa-
tible with individual rights. Modern empires therefore had a much harder time to
justify the extension of power beyond the original territory of legitimization
through simple incorporation.25 Their only means of justifying expansion was
an ideology of a “civilizing mission” based on an essentialized difference across
race, religion, language, or “developmental stage.” In this they resembled
modern nation states; indeed one could argue that the modern nation state is
a short-distance modern empire. White elites in nineteenth-century colonial
Cuba and republican Peru alike turned to an increasingly racialized system of
hegemony over the Afro-descendent and indigenous population. The issue was
not empire or republic, but fragmented or unitary sovereignty.
This point is missed in much of the recent, otherwise very helpful, decolo-
nial literature, which tends to back-extrapolate ahistorically from the 19th
and 20thcenturies.26 As long as sovereignty was conceptualized as layered and
fragmented, roughly before 1810, the essentialization of racial difference was not
a condition sine qua non for imperial expansion. The abolition of old regime
forms of collective corporate rights was obviously not the sudden trigger of
essentialized racism in Spanish America. Non-essentialized and essentialized
23 For a nuanced discussion see Kathryn Burns, “Unfixing Race,” in Rereading the Black
Legend the Discourses of Religious and Racial Difference in the Renaissance Empires, ed.
Margaret Rich Greer, Walter Mignolo, and Maureen Quilligan (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007).
24 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French
Africa, 1945–1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014).
25 In the Hispanic case there was strictly speaking a difference between aggregation and
integration but as Mazin Gomez shows the boundaries between the two concepts were in
practice malleable. Oscar Mazin Gomez, “Architect of the New World: Juan De Solórzano
Pereyra and the Status,” in Polycentric Monarchies. How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal
Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony, ed. Pedro Cardim, et al. (Eastbourne: Sussex
University Press, 2012).
26 See e. g. Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” Nepantla.
Views from South 1, 3 (2000); Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs.
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forms of racial discrimination had co-existed for the longest time.27 But the
redefinition of sovereignty turned essentialized difference into an indispensable
tool of imperial (and national) power for the first time in the 19th century.
The difference between modern and early modern empires was thus not, as
is sometimes suggested, that the latter exerted less control on their peripheries
because far away territories were hard to control with early modern technolo-
gies. Instead they were a different kind of polity altogether because their under-
standing of sovereignty was different and that in turn determined the ideology
and practices of power. Rule in the core European historic territories of the
Spanish Empire and the non-European territories did not differ systematically in
terms of the fragmented and layered sovereignty or indeed the practices of
governance. Early modern empires were empires of difference across their
European and Non-European territories. However, there was one fundamental
distinction that applied only to the new non-European territories: the lack of
historical legitimation for the exercise of power.
The need to justify imperial expansion and its continuation raised the bar
for the notion of good governance, ultimately the only potentially credible way
to legitimize the expansion of power beyond the original sphere of legitimation.
This broader context is crucial in order to understand why affirming good
governance was so absolutely crucial to the political practices that underpinned
Spanish rule in the Americas. I suggest that without the larger frame it is
impossible to comprehend the pivotal role that the maintenance of social
peace played within political practices and discourses in the Hispanic World.
Charity was one of the essential elements in the alignment of interest via
polycentric structures and it became one of the central legitimizing imperial
practices in the Hispanic world. Material sustenance for the weakest in society
was one of the backbones of support for rulers and Christian notions of charity
aligned almost perfectly with those practices of good governance providing an
ideological frame.
The power sustaining function of charitable activities took thus specific
forms in Spanish America and it is in some ways surprising that historians of
welfare have only quite recently begun to pay attention to this role. The rather
slim literature on welfare in Spanish America contrasts quite sharply with the
intense debate about the way in which caritative activity supported rule in early
modern European towns and territorial states as the historian of welfare in late
colonial Mexico Arrom has pointed out.28 If – as Arrom does – one takes one’s
27 Burns, “Unfixing Race.”
28 For the following see Silvia Marina Arrom, Containing the Poor: The Mexico City Poor House,
1774–1871 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), Introduction.
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clues from the European literature for inspiration a number of potentially
complementary readings emerge. One important link to consider is that between
charity and social control as a collective internalization of certain norms, in
Elias’s terms a habitus that began to structure expectations of the give and take
of charity.29 In the colonial context that meant the colonizers’ social norms,
which returns us to the additional need for legitimization precisely because they
were not shared between colonizers and colonized ex ante, but had to become
shared norms. How the weak and infirm were to be looked after – by families,
religious institutions, urban corporations, or ethnic groups – would thus also
become a contest over the social organization of society between pre-colonial
and colonial practices.
This raises the question of how much charity should be interpreted as an
oppressive practice.30 Elias saw the self-disciplining features of social control
mostly as a positive force towards social cohesion. Yet, many historians of
charity in Europe inspired by Foucault, and some of charitable activities in
European colonies, have interpreted it as a means to discipline and mentally
dominate colonial subjects, and as a suppression of individual freedom. Charity
went together with religious practices and thus with conversion and its disrup-
tive influence on native society.31 But one might ask whether this view should be
equally applied in the 17th or 18th century Americas when a syncretic Christianity
was the dominant religious practice. Either way, whether one sees charitable
practices in a self-disciplining key or as part of an external disciplinary mechan-
ism, both read charity as underpinning political stability and hegemony.
Yet, we also know that that the poor and infirm recipients of charity were
hardly the docile objects of elite designs for their control. Especially historians of
Catholic southern Europe and the Iberian empires have suggested that within the
dominant religious ideology charity paradoxically offered some agency to the
weakest in society, because the salvation of the rich depended on it.32 Corporate
structure allowed for the articulation of collective defenses of the weak. The
29 Norbert Elias, Ueber Den Prozess Der Zivilisation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976 [1939]).
30 Michel Foucault and Alan Sheridan, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London:
Penguin, 1997).
31 In Spanish America this is a complicated two-way process. There were also those who wrote
about pre-Hispanic indigenous Inkaic imperial practices of something akin to charity. Writers
such as Inka Garcilaso in turn cited these as a proof of the “pre-Christian but Christian” values
of indigenous peoples before the Spanish conquest and a means for the indigenous to write
themselves into European history. Garcilaso de la Vega, H. V. Livermore, and Karen Spalding,
Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press,
2006). There is no equivalent for this in the case of the Mexicas.
32 Arrom, Containing the Poor.
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ubiquity of religious confraternities in Spanish America is a case in point.
Confraternities were a mixture of cooperatives, which offered basic insurance for
life risks, and charities, whereby the latter complemented the former.33 As Bazarte
Martínez has pointed out, there was at least one confraternity for every possible
member of overlapping corporate groups in early modern Mexico be they indi-
genous, Euro-descendants, or Afro-descendants, craft guild members, merchants,
liberal professions, or royal officials and many were members of more than one,
just as they were members of more than one corporate group.34
There was mixed structure of many of the institutions of welfare in the
early modern Spains on either side of the Atlantic, which combined self-
interest and altruism in complex ways. Religious institutions and fraternities,
hospitals and orphanages or schools, and towards the end of the colonial
period poor houses all existed in a mixed economy paid for by membership
and charitable giving. The colonial order provided the legal framework within
which they operated.35 Especially larger urban institutions in the imperial
context could serve as a means to counter some of the more extreme material
effects of imperial extraction, such as they were. Charitable giving offered
social and religious benefits to the colonial elite. Yet, because they existed in
a mixed charitable/profit making economic space they could also result in
concrete material benefits for the elites while at the same time producing
some material benefits for the poor.
The remainder of this article will turn more directly to colonial Spanish
America to shed some light on how exactly charity could work as a legitimizing
strategy for imperial rule. While I recognize the important place charity had in
religious, racial/ethnic, and gender attitudes in this article I want to instead start
thinking about the issue from a more material perspective asking a very basic
question. Was charity just a way in which colonial elites tried to paper over and
mitigate the worst excesses of colonial extraction? Only in a second step I will
wonder it the pattern of elites’ considerable personal and material engagement
in the provision of welfare in turn tells us something about their motivation,
their hope for salvation, the control the poor, and/or more mundane and direct
benefits from the system?
33 Karen Ivett Mejía Torres, Las Cofradías En El Valle De Toluca Y Su Relación Con El Crédito,
1794–1809 (El Colegio Mexiquense, 2014).
34 Alicia Bazarte Martínez, Las Cofradías De Españoles En La Ciudad De México (1526–1860)
(México, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Azcapotzalco, División de Ciencias
Sociales y Humanidades, 1989), 15.
35 Mejía Torres, Las Cofradias Del Valle De Toluca, pp.47ff; Bazarte Martínez, Las Cofradias,
31 ff.
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II
A first inroad into the material side of welfare provision in colonial Latin
America could be to wonder how much of it was actually provided by imperial
institutions. It is clear that public provision in a pre-modern context needs to
be qualified, including territorial units, urban institutions, and of course
religious bodies. Within the fragmented and layered nature of the polycentric
polity the question can therefore only be answered in very imperfect ways. One
knowable fact is what the polity as a territorial unit paid for welfare out of its
budget. By the late 18th century Spanish America was divided into more than
100 treasury districts, so-called cajas. Data for many of these have survived
and were collected by TePaske and Klein in a path breaking project.36 Together
with M. A. Irigoin I investigated these over a number of years in order to
understand the political economy of colonial Spanish America in the 18th
century.37
Using these data one can trace the expenditure of the imperial treasuries on
welfare provision. As Figure 1 below shows, the answer is not much. The 18th
century Spanish American fiscal state did have some rudimentary welfare struc-
tures to look after its own officials, or more precisely their families. Much of
these funds were part of the montepios which the viceroys in Peru and Mexico
had introduced in the 1760s as a version of the same institutions created in the
Iberian peninsula.38 As Viceroy Amat y Junient in Lima argued some of the
provisions of the European institutions had to be adapted to the American
36 Herbert S. Klein, The American Finances of the Spanish Empire. Royal Income and
Expenditures in Colonial Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia, 1680–1809 (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1998); Herbert S. Klein, Las Finanzas Americanas Del Imperio Español:
1680–1809 (México, D.F.: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr José María Luis Mora: Universidad
Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapalapa, 1994).
37 Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, “The Spanish Empire and Its Legacy: Fiscal Re-
Distribution and Political Conflict in Colonial and Post-Colonial Spanish America,” Journal of
Global History 1, 2 (2006); Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, “A Stakeholder Empire: The
Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in America,” Economic History Review 65, 2 (2012);
Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe, “Bounded Leviathan: Fiscal Constraints and Financial
Development in the Early Modern Hispanic World,” in Questioning Credible Commitment.
Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capitalism, ed. D’Maris Coffman, Adrian Leonard, and
Larry Neal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe,
“Bargaining for Absolutism. A Spanish Path to Empire and Nation Building,” Hispanic American
Historical Review 88, 2 (2008).
38 Note that these were different from the Montes de Piedad mentioned below, which provided
small loans against real collateral.
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context.39 However, overall the purpose was clearly identical to that which had
led to the introduction of the institution in the peninsula, namely to look after
the surviving next of kin of royal officials, normally widows and young children.
The Monarchy would provide something like a basic life-insurance for most of its
medium to higher level officials. Alas, it would not do so at its own expense, or
in any case at that of other tax-payers. Instead, the montepios were mostly
financed by contributions from living office holders and supposed to be
self-financing. Thus they corresponded more to a modern compulsory life insur-
ance scheme for dependents than a paternalistic welfare provision by the
monarchy.40 And at 0.5 to 1.3 percent of the total expenditure of the Spanish
American treasuries they were hardly a large scale expenditure item.
The purpose of such welfare was to guarantee the loyalty of the officers of the
state but also to defend the social status of European and Euro-descendent
populations within colonial society, where visibly impoverished families of

















































Figure 1: Welfare expenditure as % of total expenditure across all Spanish American treasuries
1785–1800.
Source: See dataset (Grafe and Irigoin 2012).
39 Miguel de Amat y Junient, Reglamento Para El Gobierno Del Monte Pio De Viudas, Y Pupilos,
De Los Ministros De Las Audiencias, Tribunales De Cuentas, Y Oficiales De La Real Hacienda, De
La Comprehension De Este Vireynato Del Peru: Resuelto Por Su Magestad, Que Dios Guarde, En
Real (Lima: 1764).
40 Miguel de Amat y Junient, Memoria De Gobierno. Edicion Y Estudio Preliminar De Vicente
Rodriguez Casado Y Florentubi Perez Embid (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos
de Sevilla); Amat y Junient, Reglamento Para El Gobierno Del Monte Pio De Viudas, Y Pupilos, De
Los Ministros De Las Audiencias, Tribunales De Cuentas, Y Oficiales De La Real Hacienda.
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were the local imperial institutions looking after their own in a narrow sense
rather than a wider subject population. Montepios can hardly be read as the
policies of an imperial bureaucracy with a bad conscience or at least a conscious-
ness that the population at large had to be well governed and looked after.
This raises, however, the bigger issue of the material conditions of the vast
majority of his Majesty’s subjects in Spanish America. The point is important
precisely because the historiography has taken the extractive nature of empire
as part of the very definition of empire as we have seen in the case of Burbank
and Cooper. The early modern Spanish empire has always been described as
particularly extractive in nature, focused as it allegedly was on mining and
mineral extraction to a European metropolis. The legacy of supposedly extrac-
tive Spanish colonial institutions is at the core of some of the most influential
contributions to the question of modern economic well-being such as Acemoglu
and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail or Mahoney’s Colonialism and Postcolonial
Development.41 These have set off an intense debate about fiscal structures,
political institutions, governance practices, labor regimes, and trade regulations
that goes beyond the scope of this article.42
At least the question of a potential “colonial subsidy,” i. e. the extraction of tax
revenue from the colonies to the European territories, however, can in fact be
answered conclusively using the same data introduced above. The results of
research done by Irigoin and myself are relatively straightforward.43 The Spanish
treasuries in America raised as much in per capita taxes by the late 18th century as
did for example peninsular Spain or contemporary metropolitan France. This was a
capable tax state by the standards of the time. But only a modest share of the
American revenues was transferred to European Spain as can be seen in Figure 2,
falling from just under 12 percent in the early 18th century to less than four percent
over the course of the century. To the extent that one looks at a narrow definition of
colonial extraction as a transfer of resources from the colonial sphere to a supposed
metropolis, the notion of extractive Spanish colonial governance is a chimera.
This conclusion is reinforced when one keeps in mind the relatively modest
size as a share of the overall economy of the tax take in all early modern policies,
41 James Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative
Perspective (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Daron Acemoglu and
James A Robinson, Why Nations Fail? The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York:
Crown, 2012).
42 For a survey see Regina Grafe and Jorge M. Pedreira, “New Imperial Economies,” in The
Iberian World, ed. Fernando J. Bouza Alvarez, Pedro Cardim, and Antonio Feros (Routledge,
2019).
43 Grafe and Irigoin, “Legacy;” Grafe and Irigoin, “Stakeholder;” Irigoin and Grafe,
“Bargaining for Absolutism.”
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even if in Spanish America it increased dramatically over the course of the 18th
century albeit from a very low starting level. Arroyo Abad and van Zanden have
argued that the Spanish American transfers of resources towards the European
part of the Empire shown in Figure 2 would be equivalent to about one or two
percent of GDP. For comparison they contrast this with the much more excessive
extraction of a “colonial subsidy” by the Dutch from Indonesia in the 19th century,
which they estimate as four to eight percent of Indonesian GDP. One would want
to understand any measures of the size of the colonial economy as a guestimate
only. However, as orders of magnitude go it is now well established that the
Spanish Empire in the Americas was not an extractive polity in the fiscal sense
before the 19th century either in comparison to European polities or to other
empires.
The data provide empirical evidence that Burbank’s and Cooper’s definition
of empires as necessarily being driven by the extraction of resources is indeed
problematic. In polycentric imperial structures governance practices aimed at
reducing potential opposition by local elites were the better strategy for guar-
anteeing the survival of empire and hegemonic rule.44 Extraction to a metropolis
stood in the way of such structures and needed to be avoided. However, it
should be noted that this did not mean that the Spanish empire was not relying
on extractive practices. Rather, the beneficiaries were overwhelmingly the local
elites in the Americas rather than the peninsula. The ideology of the far-flung
empire served to legitimate economic rent-seeking at the hands of local and
regional elites. Extraction in Spanish America was a political practice of local
elites first and foremost rather than of a faraway imperial power.
44 Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, “Bounded Leviathan: Fiscal Constraints and Financial
Development in the Early Modern Hispanic World,” in Questioning Credible Commitment:
Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capitalism, eds. D’Maris Coffman, Larry Neal, and Adrian
Leonard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Figure 2: Transfers of revenues from Spanish America to Spain (share of total).
Source: see dataset in (Grafe and Irigoin 2012).
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A last set of data can help to further contextualize charity within the existing
socio-economic realities in colonial Spanish America. Economic historians use
so-called welfare ratios to estimate the material well-being of past populations.
The idea is that a consumption basket is assembled that represents a “bare-
bones” survival level in terms of the need for food, shelter, and clothing.45 That
basket is then compared to the wages of workers to understand how close to the
subsistence level, represented by an index of 1, they were. Figure 3 reports a set
of recent estimates across various colonial Latin American cities. For context
Madrid is included. The results of this study and others using slightly different
methodologies are yet again that the colonial realm should not be seen as an
exceptionally tough environment.46 Life was hard for humble peasants and









Madrid Mexico Potosi Arequipa&Cuzco
1550-1599 1600-1649 1650-1699 1700-1749 1750-1799
Figure 3: Living standards in colonial Spanish America (welfare ratios).
Source: (Arroyo Abad, et al. 2012).
45 For the technique see Robert C. Allen, “The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices
from the Middle Ages to the First World War,” Explorations in Economic History 38, 4 (2001).
46 Leticia Arroyo Abad and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Growth under Extractive Institutions?
Latin American Per Capita Gdp in Colonial Times,” Journal of Economic History 76, 4 (2016);
Leticia Arroyo Abad, Elwyn Davies, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Between Conquest and
Independence: Real Wages and Demographic Change in Spanish America, 1530–1820,”
Explorations in Economic History 49, 2 (2012); Leticia Arroyo Abad and Jan Luiten van Zanden,
“Optimistic but Flawed? A Reply,” Revista de historia Economica/Journal of Iberian and Latin
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Iberia. Instead differences across the colonial realm were larger than those
between the Americas and Iberia. There is reason to assume that living stan-
dards in the southern Peruvian Andes were particularly poor, while populations
in Mexico or Upper Peru (Bolivia) fared relatively better at least until the very
late 18th century.47 Welfare ratios that double subsistence needs probably meant
that even in bad years basic needs were covered. Indeed, we know that famines
were quite rare in colonial Spanish America.
Overall the material conditions within which charity operated in colonial
Spanish America were in many ways comparable to those in southern Europe at
the same time. We would do well to not simply equate empire with extractive
institutions. There is now sufficient evidence for Spanish America to seriously
question the notion that there was an imperial core that systematically extracted
large amounts of resources from an imperial periphery. In terms of material
conditions differences within the empire were larger than those between colo-
nial territories and European ones. Polycentric empire created thus an interest-
ing contradiction. The expansion of power beyond the original legitimization
necessitated political practices that were broadly consensus seeking and could
represent a notion of good governance mostly through decentralization.
Empowered local elites in the Americas were the empires’ strongest support.
Yet, they were also the sources of extraction of rents from American populations
at large. Charity provided by elites and their extractive capacity should thus be
understood as the two sides of the same coin.
III
Even without extraction to a colonial center there was plenty of want and misery
in colonial Spanish America. Humboldt noted in 1803 that “the streets of Mexico
swarm with from twenty to thirty thousand wretches,” most of whom were
American Economic History 33, 1 (2015); Rafael Dobado González and Hector García Montero,
“Colonial Origins of Inequality in Hispanic America? Some Reflections Based on New Empirical
Evidence,” Revista de Historia Economica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic
History 28, 2 (2010); Rafael Dobado González, “Pre-Independence Spanish Americans: Poor,
Short and Unequal … or the Opposite?,” Revista de Historia Economica / Journal of Iberian and
Latin American Economic History 33, 1 (2015).
47 For a social history of one Potosi in the 16th and 17th century see e. g. Jane E. Mangan,
Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 2005).
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reduced to passing the night sub dio, under god’s sky.48 Various estimates in the
late 18th century placed the number of indigents anywhere between 15 or 25
percent of the population of Spanish America’s largest city.49 City fathers in
Mexico City and elsewhere reacted to this with initiatives to expand both tradi-
tional charity and more controlling urban welfare means at least in part inspired
by ideas of the Enlightenment. Alms giving was encouraged, but the city also
expanded the tobacco workshop meant to employ the poorest in the late 1760s
and opened a Poor House in 1774. The impressive building of the Monte de
Piedad, a not for profit pawnbroker with strong religious links, still overlooks the
Mexico Zócalo today. It was meant to allow the lower strata of society to find
interest free credit in hard time and escape less scrupulous lenders, while
encouraging them to pray for their souls.
Material conditions in Mexico tightened in the late 18th century after a
century of very notable growth.50 But poverty reflected inequality as much as
deteriorating general economic conditions. It is worth remembering that as
societies become overall better off their potential degree of inequality increases.
This is often described as the Inequality Possibility Frontier. The intuition is
simple. In a society that is collectively at the subsistence level next to nothing
can be taken away from the politically weak and given to the strong without
endangering the very survival of the weak. As overall wealth increases the scope
for a more skewed distribution of resources also increases.51 But in pre-industrial
societies the extraction rate, that is how much of the economic pie the elites
managed to monopolize, could in fact be very high, even if inequality was
moderate. Put simply, inequality was potentially the largest threat to social
peace.
Inequality in Spanish America was local and regional as shown above. And
while the fiscal governance structure of the Empire did not result in large-scale
extraction to a supposed metropolis, it had become over time as system of
redistribution of resources within Spanish America of gigantic proportions.
Figure 4. below reproduces the figures for transfers to Spain shown in
Figure 2. But it compares those with the share of revenues collected in particular
districts in Spanish America and transferred to other fiscal districts within
48 Alexander von Humboldt and John Black (Trans.), Political Essay on the Kingdom of New
Spain (New York: AMS, 1966). cited in Arrom, Containing the Poor, 5–6.
49 Arrom, Containing the Poor, 6.
50 Amilcar Challu, “Grain Markets, Food Supply Policies and Living Standards in Late Colonial
Mexico” (PhD, Harvard, 2007); Dobado González, “Pre-Independence Spanish Americans: Poor,
Short and Unequal … or the Opposite?,” table 2.
51 Branko Milanovic, The Have and the Have-Nots: A Short and Idiosyncratic History of Global
Inequality (New York: Basic Books, 2011).
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Spanish-American. As is evident in most years 40 to 50 percent of Spanish-
American revenues were transferred outside the region where they had been
collected. The logical result was that some districts had more funds available
than they collected, while others were net exporters of capital.
There is no need here to explain the genesis of this peculiar colonial fiscal
system, which has been analyzed in detail elsewhere.52 The same is true for the
financial architecture underpinning it.53 But a few key elements of the system
are crucial in order to understand the link between imperial fiscal practices and
charity in colonial Spanish America. The massive redistribution of funds
between Spanish American regions affected through the means of the fiscal
system made some regions poorer and others richer. It was overwhelmingly
controlled by local elites, whose needs for trade finance and investment oppor-
tunities it served. It also provided liquidity for merchants, miners, and the
agricultural sector. For all practical purposes it fulfilled one of the most impor-
tant functions usually associated with the banking sector, namely the transfer
across spatial units between regions that suffered from a scarcity of investable
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A España Transferencias Intra-Coloniales
Figure 4: Intra-Colonial transfers and transfers to Spain 1729-1800.
Sources: see dataset in (Grafe and Irigoin 2012).
52 Grafe and Irigoin, “Legacy”; Grafe and Irigoin, “Stakeholder”; Irigoin and Grafe, “Bargaining
for Absolutism.”
53 Regina Grafe, “An Empire without Debt? The Spanish Empire and Its Colonial Realm,” in A
World of Public Debts: A Global Political History, eds. Nicolas Barreyre and Nicolas Delalande
(forthcoming).
Empires of Charity 149
Brought to you by | European University Institute
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/24/18 12:23 PM
merchants (consulados, tribunals de comercio y mineria) in turn provided syndi-
cated loans to the public treasuries. In so doing they fulfilled a second function
usually associated with the banking system, the ability to overcome the time
inconsistency between revenue and expenditure by drawing on credit.
The peculiar fiscal–financial colonial Spanish system had a third element.
While fiscal governance structures provided for interspatial flows of capital and
professional corporations were fundamental in organizing large-scale public
finance, religious and charitable institutions were the local backbone of credit
intermediation in Spanish America. Banking, credit, and charitable giving were
intricately linked into one material caritative complex. Endowments being given
to religious institutions but also occasionally to urban ones for charitable pur-
poses were a common feature of early modern society. Confraternities, hospitals,
convents, and monasteries all depended on alms and in particular on large-scale
donations for their material basis. In this, Spanish religious foundations had more
than a passing resemblance with Islamic waqf. Religious endowments with chari-
table purposes had a long tradition in all catholic and Orthodox Christian terri-
tories. However, in contrast to Italy or France the economic activities of Hispanic
religious and charitable institutions either side of the Atlantic came to turn into
large-scale banking activities. Religious institutions dominated credit mediation
and provision in the Hispanic reigns like in no other Christian polity. Unlike in
other catholic countries competition from private banks or notaries acting as
credit intermediaries was also rarely important. Unlike waqf Hispanic religious
and charitable endowments faced virtually no restriction to lending at interest or
investing in any matter of economic activity.
Thus the basic operation of religious confraternities across Spanish America
was to collect and accumulate substantial funds through membership fees and
much more through donations, invest these, and finance religious and charita-
ble activities with the income from those funds. The statutes of the cofradia del
Rosario de Toluca read
whenever there should be left-over funds after the ordinary expenditure is paid the mesa
[leadership] should try to invest these in valuable properties to their satisfaction and with
greatest security so that at all times they support … the capital and interest, and with that it
shall be possible to fulfil exactly the objectives of the pious works and commitments … .54
Other religious institutions, convents, monasteries, cathedral chapters, and the
tribunals of the Inquisition operated in the same way. Their financial acumen
differed vastly. The pioneer studies of Lavrin had suggested that many convents
managed their moneys poorly, but most recent historians have found astute
54 Cited in Mejía Torres, Las Cofradias Del Valle De Toluca, 141.
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financial management.55 Most institutions were also increasingly embedded in a
structure of financial oversight. Religious orders sometimes had auditing prac-
tices inside the order, Inquisition tribunals were subject to regular checks of
their books, and religious confraternities were controlled by local bishoprics,
cabildos ecclesiasticos, or church courts.56
They were also ubiquitous and covered all walks of life. In the late 18th
century a survey of confraternities found 941 confraternities in the Archbishopric
of Mexico alone.57 Most had restrictions as to who could join that were based on
professional activities or castas. In line with corporate society but somewhat
surprising from a point of view of racial attitudes the latter were not hierarchical.
Confraternities of indigenous people for example had explicit statutes to exclude
non indigenous populations from their activities. The cofradía de la Purisima
Concepción de Nuestra Señora en Cuauhtitlán ordered that for the funeral of its
members there should be only “indios, y sin españoles, negros, mestizos, mulatos,
ni chinos.”58
Religious institutions accumulated wealth through donations in cash and in
kind and through direct investment in houses, farms, mercantile activities, and
public debt instruments. Credit was given at the standard rate of 5 percent, only
among religious institutions the lower rate of 2.5 percent was sometimes observed.
Onemight think about that as a form of interbank lending.59 Much of what we know
about these institutions’ finances results from the accounts that were compiled in
repeated rounds of disentailment beginning in the late 18th century and in parti-
cular in the early 19th. Figure 5 below shows the composition of the capital reported
55 Asunción Lavrín, “The Role of Nunneries in the Economy of New Spain in the Eighteenth
Century,” Hispanic American Historical Review 46 (1966); Kathryn Burns, Colonial Habits:
Convents and the Spiritual Economy of Cuzco, Peru (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press,
1999); Gisela von Wobeser, “La Fundaciones Piadosas Como Fuentes De Crédito En La Época
Colonial,” Historia Mexicana 38, 4 (1989); Gisela von Wobeser, “La Inquisicion Como Institucion
Crediticia En El Siglo Xviii,” Historia Mexicana 39, 4 (1990); Gisela von Wobeser, “La Fundacion
De Capellanias De Misas, Una Costumbre Arraigada Entre Las Familias Novohispanas. Siglo
Xvi–Xviii,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 35
(1998); Gisela von Wobeser, El Crédito Eclesiástico En La Nueva España. Siglo Xviii, 2 ed.
(Mexico: Fondo de cultura económica, 2010); Asuncion Lavrin, “El Convento De Santa Clara
De Queretaro: La Administracion De Sus Propiedades En El Siglo Xvii,” Historia Mexicana 25, 1
(1975). For a more economic analysis in the peninsula Cyril Milhaud, “Priests or Bankers? The
Ecclesiastical Credit in Modern Spain,” Working paper hal-01180682 (2015).
56 Bazarte Martínez, Las Cofradias.
57 Ibid., 46.
58 Only Indians and without Spaniards, blacks, mixed race people, or Chinese. Cited in
ibid., 60.
59 Ibid., 158.
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by one of the most prosperous confraternities of Euro-descendants in Mexico City,
the confraternity of the Holy Sacrament and Charity. More than three fifth of its very
substantial capital was invested in so-called censos (collatoralized loans) and
irregular deposits given to private individuals, mercantile houses, miners, or agri-
cultural investors. These produced the customary 5 percent interest rate. A small
amount was lent to other religious institutions at half that interest rate. 20 percent
had been turned over to a consolidation fund, an expropriatory measure imposed
during the financial chaos of the very late colonial period.60 Just under one fifth was
invested in urban properties and rural haciendas. For all practical purposes reli-
gious institutions were very much like modern charitable endowments. Money or
sometimes property, which was pledged by individuals seeking to do charitable
work, was lent out at interest to third persons. The resulting interest payments in
turn supported practically the entire charitable and religious life of colonial Spanish
America.
What was true for confraternities was equally the case for other welfare
institutions such as the Mexico poor house. Figure 6. depicts its sources of
income again for the very late colonial period. The investments of the poor
house were substantial. Three quarters were concentrated in participations in
loans syndicated by the large corporations of miners and merchants, which
collected investments from a variety of religious and sometimes private inves-



















Figure 5: Capital of the Ilustre
Archicofradia del Santisimo
Sacramento y Caridad (Mexico) in
1826.
Source: (Bazarte Martínez 1989).
60 Gisela von Wobeser, “La Consolidación De Vales Reales Como Factor Determinante De La
Lucha De Independencia En México, 1804–1808,” Historia Mexicana 56, 2 (2006).
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and substantial loans to the public purse. The poor house also benefited from
some funds that had belonged to the Jesuits (temporalidades) expelled a quarter
of a century earlier, smaller private endowments, and some rental property. Only
3 percent of its income was derived from alms. And its pensioners, elderly and
fray people who had enough money to pay for being looked after in the poor
house, contributed another modest 3 percent.
While the concrete investment portfolios of charitable institutions in
Spanish America differed significantly, the pattern is clear. The economy of
welfare and religious charity in Spanish America was corporate in both mean-
ings of the word. It was deeply embedded in the corporate logic of colonial
society that made religious corporations and collectives part of the imperial
structure of governance. The charity they provided fulfilled imperial needs for
good governance legitimizing the hegemony of local elites. The money they
collected offered everyone in colonial society with a little capital to spare to
work on their salvation. The salvation of a sinner’s soul in turn became the
material support for the ill, the poor, and the disabled. It also became the
investable capital employed by merchants, miners, and hacendados in their
economic activities. It was thus also corporate in a more modern, capitalist
way. What Arrom has called the financial partnership of Church, state, and
private philanthropy provided for a well-capitalized and capitalist charitable



















Figure 6: Sources of income of
the Mexico poor house 1826 for
1811.
Source: (Arrom 2000, 161).
61 Arrom, Containing the Poor, chapter 2.
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IV
In Spanish America there was nothing oxymoronic about empire and charity.
They were in the literal sense two sides of the same coin. As I have argued the
empire had a problem of legitimizing rule once it had extended its reach
beyond the original sphere of political legitimization. Good governance was
more than a discursive element used by conquered and conquerors alike. In a
society that relied on institutionalized difference across corporate collective
groups it was the means to justify imperial rule. The empire was not particu-
larly extractive in terms of transfers to a supposed metropolis. The idea of the
Spanish empire as an extractive structure in terms of a colonial subsidy is
largely fiction. Yet, because the empire relied on polycentric structures that
strongly empowered local elites it incurred in a contradiction. Powerful local
elites could delegitimize the empire through local and regional abuse of their
power.
At the local and regional level charity was an integral part of imperial
practices of good governance. A material caritative complex sui generis linked
the moral economy of charity, which legitimized local elites, with their own
financing needs and those of the imperial polity via the financial acumen of
religious and charitable institutions. Saving one’s soul and investing in a profit-
able enterprise were not only no contradiction, they were aligned interests.
Charitable activities sustained and reinforced the system of castas through
separate institutions along racial/ethnic lines; they sustained gender and social
status norms by confining women of poor repute and financing dowries for
Euro-descendent girls; they reinforced the role of Catholicism as sustaining
imperial rule by financing most of the lay public religious festivities, proces-
sions, and displays; they provided crucial welfare services in a mixture of
membership-paid-for and charitable financing. At the same time, they financed
the polity and the private sector and guaranteed the self-sufficiency of the basic
welfare sector.
Historians have noted that the 18th century drive to abandon indiscriminate
charity in favor of educational and repressive measures to turn the poor into
useful members of society advocated by those inspired by European enlightened
writers had only limited success in the Americas. In Mexico City the poor
inmates of the poor house were ultimately running the poor house and managed
to fend off new-fangled ideas of well-meaning social reformers.62 Surely there
were many reasons for this outcome. But one was that the existing system
62 Ibid.
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benefited very large parts of society, donors and recipients alike. The intermin-
gling of religious, moral, economic, and social motives arguably created a stable
system that underpinned colonial rule successfully until it was unraveled from
the outside by the implosion of Spanish rule in the peninsula and from the
inside by the abandonment of layered and fragmented forms of sovereignty in
the transition to a republican order.
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